The leopard and his spots

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By DOUGLAS FISHER -- Sun Ottawa Bureau

In remarks since his role as the next prime minister was certified last weekend, an earnest Paul Martin has made the point that as yet people do not appreciate "fundamental" changes are coming in the way government and Parliament work.

In this, he seems to be heralding a return to cabinet government rather than prime-ministerial government, back to genuine parliamentary oversight of both bills and estimates, and an end to the domination of federal Canada by the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the Privy Council Office (PCO).

Such a forecast from the man soon to head the federal leviathan intrigues those of us closely watching Parliament.

For decades, advocating parliamentary reform has preoccupied me. Let's give real work to MPs of all parties. Create and maintain a public interest in a lively Parliament. Free MPs from the tag "nobodies" put on them 30 years or so ago by an arrogant prime minister.

Hope springs eternal; unfortunately so does skepticism.

We have so few particulars on these "fundamental" changes.

Perhaps the clearest one intimated by Martin is the adoption of a practice of the British House of Commons. In it, party caucuses grade beforehand the items of business to be voted on by means of a "three-line whip." This allows backbench MPs more latitude on how they vote on motions than is the case here where so-called free votes are rare; indeed, where most House votes are of "confidence" and the government is gone if it loses one.

Such a practice here would be a useful item in a slate of parliamentary reforms, but so much of its worth depends on how generous the ratings are, and, indeed, on how the opposition parties in the House exploit what may seem to many a fragmenting government caucus.

Our parliamentary matters are often given three general headings: a) As a forum or national sounding board, as in the daily oral question period; b) legislating bills into law after debate and approval by votes; and c) scrutinizing government spending, seeing it has been both properly spent and provided value for money.

In my judgment, the recent Commons have been: a) Poor, and largely farcical as a fail-safe forum with straight questions and honest answers; b) a mediocre job with bills (legislation); and c) a most inadequate job in scrutinizing spending.

The farce of question period owes much to being such an easy, cheap filler of TV newscasts.

The leading flaw in dealing with bills is the lack of input into their preparation by plain MPs, particularly government MPs, and so often the hidebound refusal of the government ministers (and their mandarins) to agree to amendments during passage.

As for scrutiny, MPs have almost always shown more interest in spending money, not in saving it or getting value from it. Frugality, by and large, is politically incorrect. Many see an obsession with it as the most cribbing factor of support for the Canadian Alliance.

For perspective on the Martin stuff on fundamental change, early in Lester Pearson's years (1963-68) there was talk, much, like Martin's, about a "working" Parliament. It was to be achieved largely by greater use of parliamentary committees, particularly on the "scrutiny" side of Commons affairs and in tackling particular subjects (such as immigration or unemployment insurance). Committees proliferated and are still numerous and active, taking far more of most MPs' time than the House itself.

But committees draw little notice from either viewers or the media, and the PM and the inner cadre around the leaders of the opposition parties tend to police the party lines and loyalties in committees. Occasionally, but far from often, collegiality comes on strong in a committee, subduing partisanship and developing a practical, consistent, critical line.

Of course, there hasn't been regular, close examination of government spending programs in the House for several decades. The House proceedings have few attendees, get little coverage by the press, and draw minute TV ratings.

Most of the standing committees are followed by their particular lobbyists or "stakeholders," etc. and are monitored and guided by the public officials, concerned with guarding their minister's repute. Senior MPs, from the prime minister to other leaders to ministers to committee chairs, spend as little time as possible in the House, just listening and occasionally taking part, and there has been remarkably little exposure of ministers and their top mandarins to a close examination by committees.

So to make the "fundamental" changes Paul Martin talks about, which would empower MPs, will require drastic changes in engrained partisan practices within the House and in its committees.

Why my skepticism that Martin will or can institute such change so dangerous to ministerial responsibility and bureaucratic authority and anonymity?

Simple answer! First, he has not been a parliamentary reformer in his 15 years as an MP; rather, he has almost always put raucous, rallying partisanship ahead of courtesy and thorough exposition for the House.

Second, he has hardly been either a democrat or a frugal politician in his blockbuster grab of control over the Liberal party as an organization -- see how he used consultants contracted to his Finance ministry in his campaign or ponder why he was so reluctant in disclosing the donors to his multimillions pot.

Third, any major devolution of power and influence to MPs of the Commons most affects the PMO, the PCO, and the deputy ministers of the administration, especially those heading central agencies like the Department of Finance and Treasury Board.

In short, his "fundamental changes" will have to either subtract authority from himself and from the federal mandarinate, giving and sharing some power and continuing influence to the MPs and House committees. He cannot make much of the House unless he and his ministers spend much more time in it, performing and listening.

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